Just being here, in something like this, is huge. I wrote a speech, but it's hard to capture ten years of one's life. You might be asking yourself, how could someone get in a situation like this? I was born in Jamaica, but I grew up in Washington State. My stepfather was in the military so I was in a military family. And we moved all over the country. I moved there [to Washington] when I was seven. When you grow up and you think of yourself as an American, you really don't think other wise, or to go to immigration when you are fourteen years old [the year his mother naturalized, thus automatically conferring on Ace his U.S. citizenship]. I bought a car when I was sixteen. And then when I was eigh teen, I got in trou ble. It was spring break and we went to Oregon.
I was in high school, ready to gradu ate, and my mother moved to Georgia. I said, okay, I'll move down with her when I gradu ate. But, I lost her phone number. We didn't have cell phones then. And I lost my pager. I was on a trip to Oregon, [to] a town called Seaside. A lot of people [ were there] on spring break. Two girls in a convertible (two white females) were in this parking lot. My friends started talking to them. Th eir boyfriends were pulling in. Th ey were drinking on the back of a pick-up and came up hostile. Every body got in the fi ght. Th e police came up and every one was trying to leave. When they came around, there were four of them on top of me in the corner.
I'm in an area where the police know the families of the kids. Th ey [the district attorney] came to me and said, "Th irty-six months. Th is is the best x • Preface we can do." I have no family. Hey, thirty-six months, are you crazy? Th is was a fi ght, but "if you go to trial and you lose you're going to get fi ve to seven years, " they told me. I served time in a boot camp program. I was proud that I graduated. On graduation day, I was told that I couldn't leave because I have this ins hold. I said, "I thought I was a U.S. citizen." Th ey said, "Can you prove it?" To tell you honestly, I didn't know if I was a U.S. citizen. I told them how I came [to the United States], with my mother. But when they said, "When did she get her U.S. citizenship?" I couldn't answer. Th ey shipped me to Arizona. To Eloy. Th ey fl ew me to Las Vegas and from there drove me to Eloy [Detention Center].
So my mother's looking for me in Washington State. By the time she found out that I was in jail, I'm in [an immigration jail in] Arizona. She was looking for me in Oregon, but by the time she found out I was in Arizona, I'm already in Jamaica.
At Eloy Detention Center
I didn't know I was supposed to see a judge. I waited three months. I never actually saw the judge until I was deported. To tell you the truth, when I went in front of the judge he didn't ask me any questions. When I spoke with the judge, as a matter of fact, there was no question and answer, so I didn't talk to the judge. " You're deported forever, " he said. Th at was really tragic. I talked to the guy there who handed me the papers and I spoke with the guards on numerous occasions and tried to get in contact with my mother. And the system is kinda set up to the fact that you don't really get to explain things. I'm eigh teen and I work at Taco Bell. You have no money for a lawyer. I was waiting to try to prove I was a U.S. citizen and I was waiting to get in touch with my family. Th ere were people waiting there [at Eloy] two years. I deci ded I was going to go along with it. What they do is if you can't prove you're right [that you are a citizen], you're deported. Th e demand is on you to prove your current situation. And really at that point in time, I was just a scared child who really didn't know where to go or where to turn.
[Seeing the judge] was like an aft ermath thing. I [had] already signed everything. It was more [like] him telling me what I did, and [then] based on what you did, you are deportable and you know that. It wasn't an investigative conversation to understand who is in front of him. More of a telling you that, "Okay, we know what you did, and you did wrong, and you're not a U.S. citizen, and you're going to be deported, and you signed this sheet of paper [agreeing to deportation]."
So I got to Jamaica [redacted], 1999. On my birthday. Th at was so bittersweet. I'm released there. I slept on the bench at Kingston International Airport. Th ey had a little police department, and I went there and said I got deported and they said, "What?!" Really, what they did was kicked me out the door. I spent that night on the bench, with the mosquitoes biting me. I was happy that I was out of the fa cil i ty [Eloy] .
My mother didn't know I was in Jamaica. I spent one year [in Jamaica] when I was fi ft een and my mother brought me to my father [who never had custody and is not listed on Ace's birth certifi cate], and that's how I knew how to get in contact with him. My father has thirteen kids, and I'm the only one that is in the U.S. Th at was so lucky. My father got in contact with my mother. "Wow, we've been looking for you!" It was a sigh of relief that I wasn't dead or hurt somewhere. Th at's the fi rst time hearing my mother's voice again. . . . It was almost painful. I didn't cry but I was alone. I'm from Jamaica but there are no Jamaicans in Washington State. I didn't have any family, no auntie or uncle. All I knew were my mother and sister, and moving to Jamaica, there wasn't even that.
I was living in the house where my father grew up, a rural area near the airport. It's really the woods, where people still have outside bathrooms. For breakfast I'd get up and go in the bush and drink coconuts. It's so amazing what you can do with a coconut. You can make oil, there's fresh meat, milk. You drink two, you'll be fi lled up. Before it's a coconut it's called jelly. It's actually soft in the middle. I lived off of jelly coconuts. Th e land also had sugarcane. Th at's not really a well-balanced diet. Th e house had holes in the fl oor and ceiling. When it rained too much you've got to set up buckets. It's the most primitive living you can think about.
In high school I had a personality. I was the [tv] anchor. I was the guy who ran for president. Moving [with my mother to Georgia] was not an option for me. I was very popu lar. I had that spark, always trying to make something out of nothing. I'm fi ve foot seven and played basketball. I started my own basketball clinic in the local area. I don't have any work so I would go to whatever shops and ask them to sponsor my team, and really that was mostly for uniforms and the rest of the money was for dinner.
Th e worst thing about it [being in Jamaica] was I couldn't say my name is Johann and I've been deported from the U.S. and I'm a citizen. Th ose people who are deported, [they] are outcasts. Th ey are looked down upon. You had your chance and you blew it. Why should I help you now? Th e fi rst couple of years were really hard because I still had an American accent. I had to come up with a story about how I went to school there but I'm back here. I'm still going with that story up to this day.
Th at was a mental drain. Th ose fi rst four years were very diffi cult for me because I had an accent and I was unable to speak Jamaican without the accent. I've been constantly somebody else. I think three people knew my true story. I don't know if you know psy chol ogy, but when you hear a foreign person that speaks another language and when they get upset they start speaking that language; it's an expression of themselves and who they are, and they relate better speaking the language they know, and feel frustrated speaking a language they don't know. Th at's me for ten years. In the seventh or eighth year I started associating myself with other deportees for the sake of being home in Amer i ca. Th at was so weird. I could relate to them whether I was a citizen or not. I could relate to them. I told one or two of them the truth because you wanted to talk to somebody. You want to tell your story.
I fi gured it out about my seventh or eighth year. My mother told me. She was under the assumption that I was unnaturalized and then deported. Up to last night I had to explain it to her. No, I didn't get unnaturalized. Th ey made a huge mistake. She was under the impression that there was nothing that could be done. And I didn't know. I only listened to what the judge told me. And the judge told me never to return.
I didn't know or understand the whole law. I knew they weren't supposed to, but they did. I signed the papers. It's my fault and the judge said never to return [Ace starts crying]. I have nightmares. I could have stayed in there. . . .
Th e system down there [in Jamaica] is so bad. Th ey're just putting medical and birth certifi cates on computer rec ords. Every thing before was manual. Th ey're checking rec ords thirty years back. I fi led on three diff er ent occasions to get [my birth certifi cate, the fi rst document in the U.S. government fi le for Ace from when he entered as a child]. I needed a birth certifi cate number. [In 2009 the Jamaican government] started an online program where they'll look for your number for you, and somebody called me and provided a number. I was so happy. I really didn't have any identifi cation. I had to be very creative just getting a tax number so I can work [in Jamaica]. All my ids are from my work ids.
[ Until obtaining the birth certifi cate] I was unable to prove who I was. I could prove who my mother was, but I couldn't prove who I was. Th is was the fi rst valid identifi cation I've had in ten years. When I got it, I told myself, this is the prettiest piece of paper I've seen.
Back in the United States
[ Aft er I arrived at the Miami airport, on December 24, 2009], Homeland [Security] stopped me. You go through the checkpoint, and they asked me how I am, and I said I was good and gave them my passport. He was looking at the computer, staring with a confused look, like he didn't know what to think or do. "What kind of trou ble have you been in?" I said, "I got something better for you." I pulled out the papers [the consular offi cer in Jamaica gave him in a xii • Preface sealed envelope, in case there was a prob lem]. I said, "Th ey deported a citizen." He said, "Th ey can't do that." I'm scared, really. I'm keeping notes, and I kid you not, the simplest thing stirs so much emotion. You hear the buzz from the hot water, coming back home, my fi rst hot shower. Th e water smells diff er ent. I've been away for so long. It's like if you haven't eaten salt for ten years and someone gives you, like, a chimichanga. We deeply appreciate the remarkable talents of Duke University Press, particularly Courtney Berger, Sandra Korn, and Liz Smith, as well as Rebecca Musselman for her index, and the insights of the readers, especially those of the fi nal reviewer, whose attention to the manuscript initially and aft er its revisions signifi cantly improved the fi nal version.
Mr. Francis lived in the
We are indebted to Johann "Ace" Francis, who contacted Stevens by e-mail shortly before his return to the United States from ten years of wrongful exile. Th ough he did not live to see this volume's publication, he inspired us and lives in every page and every story. 
Citizenship Studies and Ambiguities of the Ascriptive Citizen
Experiences such as those of Ace, a U.S. citizen deported from his own country at age nineteen, rarely receive public attention (see the preface to this volume). Ad hoc reporting by the news media tends to cover such incidents as idiosyncratic horrors infl icted by an inept offi cialdom on an unwitting, unlucky individual lacking the wherewithal to set the rec ord straight. Readers or televi sion viewers are led to believe that the events are anomalous errors amenable to correction. Stories such as ones titled "Wrongfully Deported American Home aft er 3 Month Fight" (Huus 2010) or "Texas Runaway Found Pregnant in Colombia aft er She Was Mistakenly Deported" (Dillon 2012) imply that if the individuals were more wealthy, or older, or just more articulate, or if the bureaucrat put some thought into her work, then such oddities would vanish altogether. Th e government would be using the legal defi nition of citizenship correctly, deporting only identifi able foreigners, and we would fi nd our taxonomy of citizens, on one hand, and aliens, on the other, perfectly adequate for describing diff er ent populations.
One reason that these cases are not widely reported is that it is just as difficult for journalists to produce evidence of a subject's U.S. citizenship as it is for the citizens themselves. Th e putative citizen was not conscious at the moment of her citizenship's instantiation, and dna databases are neither widespread nor transparent repositories of the truth. Testimony by mothers may not be available or may be dismissed as biased. In short, for its verifi cation the status of citizenship has no in de pen dent eyewitnesses, just state documents and their government curators. Th e government can simply insist that the documents and databases it creates and controls prove a citizen's "alienage." Citizens thus are at the mercy of information the agency opposing them is creating, maintaining, and hiding from them (Stevens 2011a). Th is makes challenges to government classifi cations diffi cult or impossible. Moreover, earlier errors may render their discovery as such impossible. Diff erences between spellings or dates on a birth certifi cate and in a database may create a permanent prob lem for someone who is a legal citizen. Or the government simply may lie about, conceal, or fail to produce evidence that might vindicate an individual's claim to citizenship, such as when Th ai offi cials assert dna results disproving citizenship but do not share the medical report with the individuals aff ected, who in turn cannot challenge the foreign status the government assigns them (Flaim, chapter 8 of this volume). Th us, largely for reasons of practical obscurity, the conundrums of those denied citizenship have been marginal to prevailing theoretical and policy debates about citizenship and immigration.
Th e essays collected here take up the challenges posed by "citizenship in question, " a phrase coined by coeditor Benjamin Lawrance. We use the term in two diff er ent senses. First, the chapters describe how states question the citizenship status of their own citizens. Second, as editors and contributors, we refl ect on how the state renders its own citizens stateless to raise our own questions about citizenship as it is presently practiced. Th e following chapters describe and theorize the signifi cance and meanings of governments mistaking their own citizens for foreigners. Th e authors also provide insights into the psychological causes and consequences of these systemic practices. Invisible to many scholars of migration and citizenship, these oft en liminal actions and possibilities illuminate concepts at the heart of citizenship.
Citizenship in Question: Evidentiary Birthright and Statelessness focuses attention on how states create and interrogate individuals' evidence of citizenship and considers the implications of the state's micro-level authorizations and revocations of this status for the concept of citizenship more generally. Some chapters focus on policies and data that reveal citizenship in question, for instance, Polly Price's review of the statistics on birthright citizenship policies and migration and birth patterns in South Amer i ca that produce de jure citizenship and eff ective statelessness (chapter 1), or Jacqueline Bhabha's cross-country analy sis of challenges facing the con temporary Roma (chapter 2). Others focus on the nuances of individual-level experiences in court cases or at the border. For instance, Benjamin Lawrance describes his experiences giving testimony on a possibly Portuguese asylum seeker in Eng land via Togo (chapter 3). And Rachel Rosenbloom writes about U.S. children delivered by midwives in Texas and denied U.S. passports who then encounter internal border patrols in their own neighborhoods (chapter 7). Th e specifi c demands birthright citizenship may incite for evidence of ancestry or other documentary proof of birthright citizenship provoke reconsidering the concept of citizenship as presently understood. Th e chapters provide new and impor tant descriptive contributions to citizenship studies and encourage retheorizing citizenship's core meanings.
In addition to exploring evidentiary challenges to proving citizenship, the essays in this collection describe eff ective statelessness and its consequences. Th is occurs when courts, relying on regional and international law, make documentary requirements so demanding that respondents cannot possibly meet them and are rendered stateless, bereft of their attendant rights under international law. As refugees from civil and regional wars in the Middle East and Africa seek asylum on a scale previously not contemplated, immigration offi ces and courts adjudicating their cases in Eu rope and North Amer i ca will have their hands full deliberating forensic questions whose proper scrutiny would require teams of investigators spanning continents. Absent funds for such work, and amid episodic panics over terrorist infi ltrators, inferences will be made based on quite literally fl imsy evidence and guesswork. Crucially for this volume, such ordeals invite close attention to those features of citizenship that appear as a series of signifi cations that begin with a registry and an identity card and end with people sorted into states staged as quasi-random boxes for the storage of those inspected. Oft en the documents send people to the locations that they prefer to inhabit, but sometimes they may be sent elsewhere because of confusions about their documented status, not their having the wrong one. Or documents may scatter people in the infi nitely vast legal space that lies between these boxlike states. Even developments in international law responsive to the plight of the stateless (Szreter 2007) cannot rescue those who cannot prove what they are not, that is, not a citizen of any state or "stateless, " any more than they can prove who they are.
Th e debate over whether to extend citizenship to undocumented residents or to further enhance barriers at the borders rages worldwide. Th is volume's contribution to such debates is to raise fundamental questions about whether the citizenship they are discussing actually exists. Th e ideology of citizenship assumes a stability not only of personal identity via documents and laws that assign citizenship but also of borders, as well as the coincidence of ge ne tic, legal, and de facto families. Yet the authors here observe how personal identities are rendered indeterminate because of changes in documentation regimes, laws denoting citizenship, and a country's borders themselves. Th ese studies of what might be called "administrative citizenship, " that is, citizenship and alienage performed by offi cialdom, reveal instructive tensions between citizenship as an abstract concept and citizenship as operationalized. From Argentina to Australia, Togo to Th ailand, regimes cannot reliably distinguish citizens from noncitizens. Such a discovery suggests the need to revisit attitudes and policies premised on viewing citizenship as categorical and easily observed.
Th e striking similarities in citizenship's (mis)recognitions across countries, the brutal consequences, and the high rate at which they are occurring suggest symptoms of underexplored qualities of the concept of citizenship. Th ese events are symptomatic of key facts and meanings of citizenship and not merely aberrations of normal citizenship conventions. Moreover, the scope of such infelicities is much larger than usually recognized. In chapter 1, Polly Price points out that in Mexico alone, forty million births are not registered, causing prob lems for those who, through their parents' citizenship, automatically acquire U.S. citizenship at birth when born in Mexico but lack offi cial paperwork and face questions about their legal identities. Kamal Sadiq describes the administrative pro cesses that produce widespread eff ective statelessness in India and Malaysia (chapter 9). He and Amanda Flaim, in her work on Th ailand (chapter 8), reveal that the very administrative regimes implemented to integrate unenumerated individuals into the state bureaucracy are actually removing them from po litical society and the welfare state altogether. Only aft er one is expected to have a piece of paper can one be judged for not having it.
Th e disparity between the rituals of administration and the facts of habituation-that people strug gle to prove through and to a bureaucracy who they are in everyday life-invites refl ection on the paradoxes of an identity that seems at once given and scripted, qualities captured by the concept of "ascriptive." According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, "ascriptive" refers to "arbitrary placement (as at birth) in a par tic u lar social status."
1 Th e sense here is that ascription is something that is not chosen but happens to one because of social or po liti cal structures. In contrast, the etymology of "ascriptive" takes us to the ritual for individuals deliberately joining a po liti cal community. During the Roman Empire, cognates of ascribere referred to the fi rst step of submitting one's name for the purpose of enrolling in a Roman colony, a pro cess Latins could use to become Roman citizens (Smith 1954, 18) .
2 Th e act of securing and performing their membership was their ascription to a par tic u lar group.
Ascriptive citizenship can be defi ned as an identity that can occur through writing. Or it can be defi ned as ontological, that is, given at birth, as if biologically. 3 Th ese possibilities and their relation invite analyzing citizenship through tropes of deconstruction. Th e metonymic relation among citizenship's qualities as natu ral (from the Latin nasci, meaning "birth"), a legal identity, and an identity ascertained by writing suggests opportunities for refl ecting on the meanings of their disruptions, paradoxes, and chaotic confusions. What if the events bringing citizenship's failures to the fore are not just burdens on the individual but revelations of how written ascription materializes, more or less completely, into that ascription experienced as given, as at birth? Susan Coutin, a scholar who has for years grappled at close range with documentary regimes and thus is familiar with the elusive and illusory truths of "real citizenship, " writes: "Of course, 'real' [citizenship] is a problematic term, a point that suggests that distinctions between 'real ity' and 'fi ction' may be diffi cult to sustain. Th is diffi culty arises not because law 'in action' diff ers from law 'on the books' but rather because by creating the domain of the undocumented, the unauthorized, and the 'as if, ' law itself gives rise to its own violation, creating worlds that are governed both by law and by something else that is not law" (Coutin 2013, 112). Another way to represent citizenship's paper-thin and thick realities is as the materialization of legal words into things, along the lines celebrated by G. W. ). Citizenship's propensity to include and exclude members, that is, national protagonists and antagonists, arbitrarily and the location of these modern operations in written, civil law are strong inducements to mobilize for citizenship's interpretation insights of deconstruction. Th e content as well suits the form, a method that emerged out of questioning deportations based on citizenship being stripped or denied by laws instantiating seemingly biological distinctions the laws themselves created. 4 Citizenship law lends itself to such interventions-to wit, Annette Appell's observation that "the birth certifi cate is proof of these facts [of age, sex, gender, nationality, race, and parents] (even when it is counterfactual)" (2014, 9). Citizenship's forensic (i.e., legal and public) evidence may be counterfactual to other rec ords and testimonies, and the court fi ndings using these incoherent documents for performing our citizenship are alerting us to something impor tant about the construction of citizenship's contradictions and ambiguities.
By revealing the contingent, questionable documentary evidence constituting citizenship, these chapters convey the literary quality of legal membership. Drawing on insights from Derrida, they help us refl ect on how citizens are textual creations materialized by the force of law (Derrida 1989-90) . Perhaps the clearest evidence of the force of identity documents and their dangers is concern about fraud. Defenses against documents misconstrued as deceptive suggest an autoimmune response. To keep out unwanted invaders, the sovereign attacks its own community, more or less indiscriminately. Benjamin Lawrance (chapter 3), Beatrice Mc Ken zie (chapter 6), Rachel Rosenbloom (chapter 7), and Kamal Sadiq (chapter 9) reveal hardships entailed by vigilance about fraud that is overzealous or animated by prejudice. Crucially, this collection problematizes Hannah Arendt's famous assertion about the protections citizenship aff ords us that humanity does not (Arendt 2007b [1943] , 273) and suggests qualities of citizenship akin to Plato's pharmakon (Derrida 1981b (Derrida [1968 , esp. 100-101). Just as writing more generally is a pharmakon that has qualities of a cure and poison, citizenship, meaning citizenship as certifi ed, may be benefi cial and also itself harmful.
Ace's U.S. citizenship-a source of protection and of danger-derived from his mother's naturalization and is an arbitrary placement (as at birth). Th is would be true as well were he a U.S. citizen by birth in the United States. Th is also would bestow citizenship on him by means of an "arbitrary placement (as at birth)" through jus soli (law of soil). And the same holds were he to have become a U.S. citizen at birth outside the United States to parents who were U.S. citizens, through jus sanguinis (law of blood). 5 Th ese legal terms of art used throughout this collection convey the ambiguities of citizenship as inherently legal and scripted-on and from a map or a family tree, paradigmatically of children born in the legally fashioned relation of wedlock-and also as signifying the phenomenology of preliterate, material facts of soil and blood. 6 In modernity, citizenship is the cornerstone of any po liti cal society as a membership organ ization, and it is the quin tes sen tial ascriptive form of being, an identity "as at birth, " to recall the dictionary's ambiguous defi nition. "As" could convey that this identity occurs at birth. Or, "as" might mean that an ascriptive status is created as if at birth. With the ascription of one's citizenship and other hereditary status identities, including race, it is as if we were born with certain prepo liti cal characteristics. Writing that uses the alphabet, not hieroglyphics, effects the signifi ed as a word and not a thing, materializing, in this context as an identity card as citizenship, and not just evidence thereof (Derrida 1988 (Derrida [1972 ). Citizenship's registration system also creates a state archive with implications for state power: "Th e power of the archive and of the historico-political order always maintains, within the broadest structures of the apparatus of writing, an irreducible adherence to power that is properly epistemic" (Derrida 1979, 143). Th rough sheer repetition, the hy po thet i cal condition of a written status "as at birth" comes to defi ne the signifi cance of what might be (a merely written entry) as what is (the state's knowledge and power) "as at birth." Th is significance of birth, the meaning of qualities we imagine we acquire ambiguously "as at birth, " as opposed to those developed as if at birth (as recognizable copies) or later (as recognizable self-craft ings or social-craft ings-both of which affi rm the authority of the written original) (Butler 1991, esp. 22)-and the signifi cance of a national identity, are so central to who we are that we come to believe we are ontologically as the government interpellates us at birth. Our citizenship rules convey who we are as if we were born this way, and this hy po thet i cal condition materializes us into these actual state facts.
Nonetheless, the nonfi ctionalization of ascription, an inherently literary pro cess, has failed millions of us. It is tempting to imagine these failures result from a combination of defi cits of resources and goodwill. But the chapters here, reiterating the same state-led patterns of exclusions, do not suggest there is an under lying truth of birthright citizenship states are not recognizing. Rather, they reveal that we are not citizens in the ways we oft en imagine we are, as if we were born this way without the state, as though being born Portuguese or Pakistani is the same as being born with brown or green eyes. But of course this is not exactly right, and we need to think further on how birth does and does not create a citizen. Th e dictionary's parenthetical reference to ascription "as at birth" is precisely what the politics of citizenship's geographic (not geologic) and kinship (not ge ne tic) rules contravene. Th is is an observation one might make simply on the basis of observed laws, but the sorts of observed disruptions that are occurring in practice between the signifi er (i.e., facts and rec ords about birth and other biographical events) and the signifi ed (i.e., state-recognized citizenship) further yield impor tant insights about the sign "citizen." 7 Th e preceding discussion, alluding to the events and ambiguities noted in this volume, plays virtually no role in dominant po liti cal theories of citizenship, which tend to cluster among three diff er ent positions. Th e fi rst recognizes and endorses clear demarcations between citizens and aliens, and the prerogatives of the nation-state to carefully control and monitor entry of the latter. Th e chapters are gathered here as a response to this fi rst and most widespread intuition about the idealized benefi ts of preserving the nation-state's conventional bound aries between insiders and outsiders. Rather than challenge views at the level of abstract arguments mobilized by po liti cal theory, or economic analyses on the costs and benefi ts of free movement versus strict border controls, the essays herein provide repre sen ta tions and analyses of what citizenship looks like at a granular level, including the disputes over the very grains and colors of the paper and ink of which it is constructed.
Th ese analyses of citizenship in practice require questioning key assumptions informing our more general theories of citizenship. For instance, many believe citizenship using laws of descent excludes racialized others and that citizenship through the rights conveyed by jus soli would include them. But lacunae in the archives of descent in the United States result in the deportation of more U.S. citizens, largely those of Mexican descent, than failures of laws eff ecting citizenship through jus soli (Stevens 2011a). In other words, people born in Mexico whose parent or parents are U.S. citizens may acquire U.S. citizenship at birth automatically by operation of law but then fail to have this recognized by the U.S. government. None of this is offi cial policy, but eff ective statelessness results nonetheless. Th us, citizenship's enforcement occurs in places and through discourses that are largely invisible to the broader public and even to those with expertise on citizenship.
Kristin Collins (2014), in her work on citizenship by descent in the United States, notes the break between law and practice. Describing the inconsistency between the citizenship policy objective of avoiding statelessness and the implementation of citizenship laws in the context of countries that reciprocally followed patrilineal rules for citizenship, she writes: "In the many hundreds of pre-1940 administrative memos I have read that defend or explain recognition of the nonmarital foreign-born children of American mothers as citizens, I have identifi ed exactly one memo by a U.S. offi cial that mentions the risk of statelessness for the foreign-born nonmarital children of American mothers as a concern" (Collins 2014, 2205n283). Collins recognizes that even though government is creating a method that will systematically render stateless children of U.S. citizens, this operation invites no systematic caution, much less antidote.
As is the case for much work in the fi eld of population production, it is tempting to turn to Michel Foucault's theories of biopower and governmentality. But the per sis tence of scenarios such as the preceding one revealing citizenship's certifi able failures of signifi cation are those of a randomly acting pharmakon, and not a systemic toxin used in a uniform fashion against a per sis tent other. Th ese government transcriptions pose a prob lem for the prevailing Foucauldian disciplinary critique of power and may be one reason these rereadings and rewritings elude theoretical scrutiny: the government's power is being exercised incoher-ently, by local decree, and largely in de pen dent of any standardizing, normalizing discourse. Th e forces of power and knowledge responding to citizens as aliens, or treating citizens of one country as though they were not citizens of that country, or treating those who are stateless as though they were citizens of a country, are not being implemented through professional or government networks whose concepts might be or ga nized and mobilized in any recognizable pattern, even one that is subtle and diff use.
10
Th e lessons from this collection might be situated alongside the research on inequalities of ethnicity, race, sex, and sexuality that eventually was superseded by questions about whether one could meaningfully discuss these categories as self-evident to anyone save the naive observer. Th ese essays examine the frays at the bound aries of citizenship's legal recognition. As opposed to debates premised on certainty as to shared knowledge of who is and who is not a citizen, this proj ect focuses on the uncertainty of these bound aries and their po liti cal, psychological, and personal meanings. Th e studies in this collection extend inquiry into the theoretical claims about citizenship's contingencies to observations about its individual-level assignations. Just as studies of the discourse of the hermaphrodite called into question intuitions assuming two discrete sexes (Barbin 1980; Fausto-Sterling 1992), and the nonprocreative unions of early Christians troubled claims about the traditional reproductive, heterosexual family (Boswell 1994), and new fi ndings and then discourses on ge ne tic variation undermined ontological taxonomies of race (Hey 2001), the essays in this collection, by revealing micro-level, even molecular-level, confusions about citizenship, challenge the assumption that citizenship is the sort of self-evident characteristic that one either has or lacks.
11 Th e discrepancies between our ideologies of citizenship and its daily operations raise questions about the meaning of these disparities on which these chapters refl ect.
If citizenship is the state's certifi cations of citizenship, and if these are not self-evident but a legal gray zone (Morawetz 2007a), then citizenship suggests a diff er ent morphology (of existence and research) than heretofore understood. Just as insights about the politics of taxonomies and heuristics have reshaped discussions of equality among putatively natu ral groups, knowledge about the operational details of assigning citizenship has the potential to profoundly aff ect understandings of this identity as well. To many, it may seem that the phenomenology of citizenship already encompasses practices that are legal, and not biological. Unlike the one-drop rule embraced in the Supreme Court decision Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), for instance, the taxonomies of citizenship seem transparently administrative, and not biological. Even those who perceive nationality as a natu ral, material, inherited fact might be sympathetic to problematizing laws on birthright citizenship, understood as acts of government, not nature.
12 But this does not occur. Long-standing and widely shared, though inaccurate, intuitions about identities wrought through birth explain why the concept of citizenship based on birth in a geopo liti cal territory still incites some of those along the southern border of the United States to fi ght as Minutemen, and Minutewomen, on behalf of identities created by state cartographers. Even for those who are po liti cally active, the phenomenology of birth inspires a defense of a citizenship that is purely nominal, and not incitements to voter turnout drives, regardless of whether the citizen's identity as such emerges through the state's sacralization of lineages of family or lines on maps. 13 Likewise, families take shape and change in all sorts of ways inconsistent with the expectations of citizenship laws, both through the creation of new laws for marriage and legitimacy and within specifi c families, pursuant to changes of marriage, divorce, adoption, and remarriage. Amid the legal fl ux, citizenship's categorization remains rigid, discrete, and largely exclusionary. Importantly, earlier Eu ro pean governments seemed more interested in accommodating these ambiguities in the laws regulating the civil registers through including uncertain cases. Th e postrevolutionary French Civil Code of 1792 "did not require mayors to declare the truth of an individual's 'real' or 'natu ral' identity. . . . It was not by chance that the Civil Code prescribed the sex of an infant should be 'stated' and not 'verifi ed' " (Noiriel 2001, 44). Gérard Noiriel describes the tribune Simeón disparaging authorities during the Revolution demanding proofs and "treating as an inquisition" reviews of marriage and legitimacy: "It was thus explic itly to protect individuals against arbitrary treatment and to ensure ' family harmony' that the Civil Code defi ned civil identifi cation as the certifi cation of statements and not research into the truth of an individual's identity" (Noiriel 2001, 44) . If the truth of the family were easily discerned, there could be no inquisition. If family facts are potentially ambiguous, due to any of a number of factors-from changes in bound aries to laws that might eliminate a parent's identity at birth, to the vagaries of the sex of the parent or the child-then citizenship is inherently in question and thus at odds with the prevailing ideology that it is self-evident.
Chapter Overviews
Th e chapters herein reveal what it looks like when citizenship in practice today bumps into the contingencies of borders, laws, and ( family) life. To supplement the meanings of "de jure" or " legal" as adjectives denoting the state's recognition of citizenship, these chapters reference "eff ective" citizenship and also statelessness. Legal citizenship or statelessness may be irrelevant to ensuring the rights associated with either status. Eff ective citizenship is citizenship that would be recognized as such save for quasi-legal, oft en pseudolegal challenges by government agents, be they border agents or federal judges. Evidentiary questions may arise because of ambiguities in documents, databases, borders, or laws. Th e venues where these disputes occur may be at the border, or in homes, workplaces, administrative offi ces, mail, civil hearings, prisons or immigration jails, or court proceedings. Indeed, in many cases questions about citizenship crosscut several of these dimensions and locations. Th e cases discussed here also bring into play jurisdictional and evidentiary standards for two or more countries that implicate prob lems of what Polly Price calls "eff ective statelessness, " when people cannot prove citizenship and are eff ectively stateless even though the country of their residence does not recognize this statelessness at law. In other words, by operation of law, as the cases in the chapters by Jacqueline Bhabha and Benjamin Lawrance highlight, the government may refuse to recognize people either as citizens or as stateless, leaving them outside the protections of international law designed precisely to address the vulnerability of those Hannah Arendt singled out as the most po liti cally fragile group that exists ( those without a state) (2007a [1944] ).
Th ese contributions are amenable to several pos si ble groupings. Th e ones chosen for this volume emphasize, in part I, how global politics of sovereign borders, as well as interpretations of international and regional law, manifest in citizenship determinations. Th ese fi rst chapters introduce readers to how civil authorities respond to dyadic, regional, or global treaties and institutions, including those developing legal defi nitions of statelessness. Th e scenarios exemplifying government decisions framed by international and regional law occur in administrative venues and also courts.
Th e second and third sets of chapters are or ga nized by venue. Chapters in part II describe determinations and exclusions imposed by frontline offi cials or administrators, that is, those who are directly operationalizing citizenship challenges and denials. Chapters in part III exemplify how national, electoral politics and campaigns may throw the citizenship of leaders and then of the populace into question; they also theorize what it means when people create these distinctions, and thus defi ne one portion of themselves as aliens.
international and regional protocols: citizenship and statelessness protocols
In chapter 1, "Jus Soli and Statelessness: A Comparative Perspective from the Americas, " Polly Price explains the global fi ssures, as well as the treaties and institutions, that instantiate citizenship's as well as statelessness's rules, hurdles, and inadequate protocols for redress. By focusing on how movement among jus soli regimes may produce statelessness, Price alerts readers to how rules that appear inclusive may in practice be exclusive. Price reviews how twenty countries, from Canada in the North to Chile in the South, constitute populations of citizens eff ectively stateless. Quoting from a U.S. State Department report, Price describes children born to the Ngobe-Bugle, a group that migrates from Panama to Costa Rica for plantation work: " 'In these cases the children were not registered as Costa Rican citizens because the families did not think it necessary to register the births, but when the families returned to Panama, the children were not registered there, either' " (U.S. Department of State 2011e). Price highlights the hy poc risy of such infelicities in citizenship's recognition as she explores how international law and treaties acknowledge both the possibility of statelessness and their own massive failure to address it, as well as the consequences for subsequent generations also rendered stateless.
In chapter 2, "Th e Politics of Evidence: Roma Citizenship Defi cits in Eu rope, " Jacqueline Bhabha uses the concept of "legalized illegality" (Çağlar and Mehling 2013) to explore what happens in the absence of documentary evidence for Roma citizens of several Eu ro pean countries. Paying special attention to the Eu ro pean Union and drawing on insights from her earlier work on how evidentiary challenges produce statelessness (Bhabha 2009, 2011), Bhabha draws our attention to failures of regional and global institutions that portend to extend citizenship and also to protect the stateless. Despite regional and international laws demanding other wise, gaps in civil registries, as well as inconsistencies between those entries and the papers in possession of the Roma (e.g., diff er ent spellings or dates of birth), result in substantial deprivations of health care, education, employment, and housing.
Chapter 3, "Statelessness-in-Question: Expert Testimony and the Evidentiary Burden of Statelessness, " draws on Lawrance's experiences as an expert witness for asylum seekers in the United Kingdom, analyzing the specifi c operations in individual cases that produce statelessness. For instance, one account reveals how a woman walked into a government offi ce as a Portuguese national and left eff ectively stateless. In this and the legal decisions made by offi cials in Togo, Portugal, and France aff ecting outcomes in the United Kingdom, Lawrance details how citizenship is waylaid by decisionism, with bureaucrats and judges substituting their own guesswork for the legitimate narratives of those before them. Lawrance provides an insightful discussion of the paradoxical signifi cance of legal practices creating eff ective statelessness based on government misreadings of their own documents.
In chapter 4, "Reproducing Uncertainty: Documenting Contested Sovereignty and Citizenship across the Taiwan Strait, " Sara Friedman situates the production of documentary ambiguities in the context of the fraught relations between the governments of Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. Drawing on extensive interviews with border-crossing spouses and the government offi cials issuing identity papers, Friedman uses her close readings of their statements to question Derrida's eff ort to separate the role of intention from the force of documentary identities. Friedman, an anthropologist, off ers an ethnography of a Taiwanese government offi cial's anxiety about forged documents being used by mainland Chinese to enter Singapore (for work) and not Taiwan, and the elaborate system in place to authenticate the copy. Her chapter creatively draws on work by Yael Navaro-Yashin (2007, 86) to interpret the nuances in a range of contexts producing and interrogating documentary identifi cation and theorizing how geopo liti cal structures mobilize "emotional investment for their bearers . . . intertwined with the material form of the documents themselves" for the bureaucrats and supplicants alike.
Again engaging the implications of sovereign decisions on the world stage for the quotidian level of an individual's identity, in chapter 5, Kim Rubenstein explores the impact of colonization on the nation-state's understanding of citizenship. In "What Is a 'Real' Australian Citizen? Insights from Papua New Guinea and Mr. Amos Ame, " Rubenstein (with Jacqueline Field) draws on information she encountered through her legal repre sen ta tion of Amos Ame in his eff ort to have the Australian High Court persist in recognizing him as an Australian citizen, a claim the court rejected on the grounds that the population of Papua New Guinea became part of Australia through what one commentator calls an "accident of Eu ro pean history" (Waiko 1993, 26) . Th e High Court affi rmed the removal from Mr. Ame of his Australian citizenship on the grounds that he was not a "real" Australian. Th e judge ruled that following Papua New Guinea's in de pen dence, its new borders ex post facto correctly defi ned Mr. Ame's Australian citizenship.
In sum, the chapters in part I reveal how fl uid boundary formations, crossings, and transformations in the context of global and regional laws of the postWestphalian international system, as well as the quandaries raised because of colonialism and its aft ermath, put citizenship in question.
official or administrative acts Th e chapters in part II focus in more depth on how administrative judgments produce in eff ec tive citizenship. From bureaucrats employed by the United States in the late nineteenth century to Indian government workers today, these chapters document the technical operations that produce in eff ec tive citizenship and eff ective statelessness. In chapter 6, "To Know a Citizen: Birthright Citizenship Documents Regimes in U.S. History, " Beatrice Mc Ken zie, former vice-consul in the U.S. embassy in Kampala, Uganda, off ers close readings of several U.S. court cases in which judges evaluated the suffi ciency of individuals' facts and documents proving citizenship. Th e trajectory of the decisions she selects, focused on Chinese exclusion cases in the United States, suggests changing standards of scrutiny over time for verbal and written statements about facts. Attention to these cases highlights both the discretionary character of citizenship fi ndings and their reliance on subjective, nonwritten criteria that are systematically racist.
Rachel Rosenbloom, a former supervising attorney for the Post-Deportation Human Rights Proj ect at Boston College Law School, testifi ed before Congress on the unlawful detention and deportation of U.S. citizens (U.S. House of Representatives 2008). Rosenbloom's chapter 7, "From the Outside Looking In: U.S. Passports in the Borderlands, " pres ents original research on recent policy directives, as well as the new internal border policing and harassment of U.S. citizens behind the uptick in U.S. passport denials in south Texas. Rosenbloom also reveals how transborder lives prompt parents to register as born in Mexico children who were in fact born in territory under U.S. sovereignty (an unidiomatic way to state "the U.S." in order to reiterate the artifi ce and contingency of nonfraudulent U.S. birth certifi cates, insofar as Texas was until 1848 the sovereign territory of Mexico). Rosenbloom points out that despite this ruse being well known to Texas county clerks, State Department adjudicators ignore the accurate Texas birth certifi cates and, aft er locating fraudulent Mexican birth registration, defer to narratives of fraud against the U.S. government and reject U.S. citizens' passport applications. Her research indicates the precariousness, unreliability, and centrality of government papers for assigning citizenship and highlights the importance of these evidentiary reviews to determinations of U.S. citizenship.
In chapter 8, "Prob lems of Evidence, Evidence of Prob lems: Expanding Citizenship and Reproducing Statelessness among Highlanders in Northern Th ailand, " Amanda Flaim draws on the fi eld research she obtained from a 2009-11 United Nations study she designed and supervised. Flaim surveyed 292 villages with more than 700,000 people and found a civil registration system that on the basis of putative dna tests and other seemingly arbitrary or pseudoscientifi c fi ndings produced statelessness incommensurate with under lying biographies. One statement from a stateless villa ger is especially revealing: "I was working in the fi elds when a man . . . interviewed my young daughter and my el derly mother-in-law about every one in the house. When I came home from the fi eld, I saw a piece of paper, but I couldn't read it and I didn't know what it was. My mother-in-law and my child did not understand what it was either. Th en I let my children play with the paper, but they tore it up." Th is individual's statelessness thus was produced by the state's tracking of her, as well as her location and illiteracy, not her legal status.
In chapter 9, "Limits of Legal Citizenship: Narratives from South and Southeast Asia, " Kamal Sadiq extends his research into "paper citizens" (Sadiq 2008) by describing more recent fi eld research in India and Malaysia on how the enormous expansion of the twentieth-century state is paradoxically producing statelessness. Sadiq's work conveys a point that emerges from Flaim's research as well. As Sadiq puts it, the state's requirement of identity papers to keep its machines humming means an incessant demand for "information that the poor, the homeless, and the mobile do not emit." Sadiq thus alerts us to how the Indian welfare state, like many others described in this collection, fails the very people on whose behalf it was seemingly designed.
Th is view of the modern state provides a new context for considering Jane Caplan and John Torpey's claim in their impor tant 2001 collection that Weberian equality before the law "tends to raise up persons and groups who had previously been thought not worthy of notice, yet it si mul ta neously reduces those subordinated to the state's governance to a status as subjects of direct administration and surveillance" (5) . An examination of the micropractices of modern states, perhaps especially in postcolonial, developing countries, suggests that the infrastructures established for equality before the law are actually removing the poor from government social welfare programs rather than enhancing access to them. Such patterns contradict T. H. Marshall's (1992 [1949] ) theory that enlarging citizenship increases the availability of access to new material rights. Again, these insights are available only by aggregating the individual-level analyses of what Sadiq calls "state artifacts" of identity documents and their specifi c function in producing class-based internal civic banishment, because of and not despite protocols of modern citizenship. Together the chapters in part II reveal how the hurdles of documentation, refl ecting more and less overt and targeted commitments to national purity, deprive millions of their citizenship rights.
For the most part, evidentiary challenges to citizenship occur in dark corners of bureaucracies, their details only vaguely articulable even by those directly affected. But on occasion disputes erupt not only in courts but also in public discourse during po liti cal campaigns or over local cases. Although the forensics of citizenship generally receive little public attention, national elections may trigger attention to the citizenship bona fi des of po liti cal candidates and thus also make salient citizenship's delineations among the population more generally. Both Margaret Stock and Alfred Babo explore how strategic questioning of the citizenship status of presidential candidates and presidents occurs in tandem with broader legal changes and public conversations about these. Margaret Stock, a practicing immigration attorney, professor, and retired U.S. Army col o nel who craft ed citizenship policies to allow U.S. military personnel to naturalize, reviews how certain campaigns in the United States have questioned the citizenship of presidential candidates and sitting presidents, and how a proposed change to U.S. citizenship law would have made it impossible for past presidents to have assumed offi ce. Chapter 10, "American Birthright Citizenship Rules and the Exclusion of 'Outsiders' from the Po liti cal Community, " historicizes the attacks of "birthers" on the credibility of President Barack Obama's Hawaiian birth rec ords, reviews the origins and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's references to a "natu ral born citizen, " and explains the implications of more restrictive rules for U.S. citizenship for past presidents and what this might mean going forward.
In chapter 11, Alfred Babo describes the strategic questioning of presidential candidate Alassane Ouattara's nationality as Ivorian, or ivoirité, a term employed by a previous president, Henri Konan Bédié. Babo's chapter, "Ivoirité and Citizenship in Ivory Coast: Th e Controversial Policy of Authenticity, " documents how candidates used ivoirité, an autochthonous authenticity rhe toric, to "eliminate po liti cal rivals." Babo takes readers back to the origins of authenticity and its aft ermath. He documents how its implementation has resulted in discrimination against "hundreds of thousands of Ivoirian nationals" and "permitted government agents, particularly the military and police, " to challenge the authenticity of identity documents and thereby strip citizens of their rights. Stock and Babo describe the intersection of national elections with broader policy debates. Stock focuses on the ambiguity of laws and unintended consequences of nativist interpretations, while Babo attends closely to the evidentiary reviews that occur more frequently in the wake of disputes over presidential qualifi cations.
Babo explic itly highlights the episodic character of these questions, which arose in 1993 and resulted in the defeat of presidential candidate Ouattara, even though in 2010 Bédié "reversed himself and appealed to his supporters to vote for Alassane Ouattara, who was henceforth permitted to run for election aft er a long battle over his nationality and citizenship issues, " a turnaround revealing the situational if not arbitrary or even random timing of these challenges. Likewise, Stock points out how similar citizenship challenges could have been but were not posed of presidential candidates at diff er ent periods in U.S. history.
In chapter 12, "Th e Alien Who Is a Citizen, " I refl ect on the meaning of the U.S. government detaining and deporting its own citizens. Drawing on insights from Franz Kafk a and Derrida, the chapter explores how these episodes might best be understood as apologues, that is, morality stories told to enhance the government's authority, and not as rational eff orts to make individualized determinations of citizenship. Th e chapter explores the meaning of these cases through deconstructions of illustrative court decisions and a regulation explaining how "aliens" may prove they are "U.S. citizens" in an immigration court, a paradoxical protocol, since by defi nition aliens are not U.S. citizens. Th e scenarios in law and practice highlight Kafk a's depiction of harms infl icted by bureaucracies in liberal democracies as a form of self-oppression characteristic of modernity.
Fi nally, Daniel Kanstroom's aft erword draws on insights gleaned from his own pathbreaking scholarship and litigation as the founding director of the Boston College Law School Post-Deportation Human Rights Proj ect. Kanstroom has been developing protocols for a Declaration on the Rights of Expelled and Deported Persons. His aft erword opens with a tantalizing thought experiment on the proof that might be demanded of someone claiming to be a citizen of the world, refl ects on the prob lems for those claiming citizenship in one nation-state, and explains the importance of expanding human rights protections to all people, regardless of recognized citizenship.
Bias, Aff ect, Money
Many other themes crosscut the material in these three parts, including the distinction between deserving and accidental or strategic citizens; decisionism at all levels of government review; the aff ect elicited by identity papers; and monetary barriers to eff ecting recognition of one's citizenship. Th ese themes do not intersect in any obvious way but emerge as key factors that shape the possibilities of achieving eff ective citizenship. Th e idea of deserving citizens appears in Mc Ken zie's chapter. Mc Ken zie's recollections of her consular work recalls as well Bhabha's epigraph quoting French president Nicolas Sarkozy on the difference between immigrants who are "worthy" of French nationality and those who are not. Mc Ken zie's point about people who can tell a recognizable story about their citizenship captures a recurring pattern of offi cial decisions based on biases and traits that are extralegal but have impor tant consequences for supplicants seeking offi cial status. For instance, Babo points out the encounter of a woman whose application for a national identity card was rejected in the Ivory Coast because of a patronymic name associated with Burkina Faso. Aft er fl uently speaking to the agent in the local dialect, the offi cer "insulted her mother and asserted that such women sold their Ivoirian nationality to foreigners by marriage." Similarly, Friedman, Flaim, Lawrance, and Rosenbloom emphasize the role of snap judgments by border agents or low-level offi ce clerks-the absence of evidence or reason leading Flaim to describe the contingency of agents' mere "beliefs, " and Lawrance, the specious "assumptions" absent evidence driving these offi cial, life-altering determinations.
Relatedly, several chapters point out the role of aff ect in these seemingly formal engagements. Friedman describes the "aff ective states" of desire, anxiety, humiliation, lack, and pride that are "intertwined with the material form of the documents themselves" (chapter 4; and see Stoler 2004) and also register in the encounters between the offi cials and the applicants. Lawrance describes the inquisitorial atmosphere incited by paper documents whose information comes largely from what one's parents provide to authorities for birth registries and certifi cates, and about which the individual possessing an identity card would have no fi rsthand knowledge.
Sadiq describes how the state artifact of citizenship documentation has "aff ective attributes . . . of loyalty, belonging, membership, and identity." Document fees pose more prosaic monetary hurdles to obtaining identity documents, a tax not only on the right to vote but also on the right to have any legal recognition whatsoever. Such impediments are impor tant to debates in citizenship studies about the relevance of citizenship to welfare and other civil and po litical rights (Soysal 1994 (Soysal , 2012 .
In addition to citizenship and migration studies, these chapters raise questions about newly emerging research questions at the intersection of po liti cal theory and administrative law. Th e investigations that follow, in conversation with the research agendas of Giorgio Agamben and Foucault, as well as left and right critiques of liberal democracies by Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt, respectively, invite us to refl ect on the signifi cance of civil and not criminal legal institutions as the sites of these encounters. Th ere are crucial diff erences among the discourses, institutions, and sovereignty noted by these theorists and the paradoxes of citizenship's (mis)recognitions. Whereas Foucault and Agamben stress biopower that is producing its own subjects and narrating its own authority, the legal dilemmas for citizenship in question lack a coherent epistemic or po liti cal logic and do not even tell a good story. One might fail at being Th ai because a child throws away a piece of paper, or because a government offi cial requires a dna report and then sits on the results. Second, the sovereign decisionism that pervades all of these encounters advances its authority through civil and not the criminal or national security laws discussed by Benjamin and Schmitt. At the same time, such laws allow and incentivize physical vio lence, oft en commingled with rhe toric of criminality and illegality that is largely not triggered by other encounters with civil authority. And third, the subversions of citizenship from within its own practices refl ect neither the racist logics described in critiques of failed liberalism, nor the coherent subject positions of most Foucauldian discourse and analy sis. Th ese chapters are about the ascribed per for mances of the inherently ambiguous statuses of the citizen and the alien and also their remarkable per sis tence as such across time and space, unlike the abstractions of the Foucauldian sodomite and homosexual, for instance, which have specifi c meanings based on patterns inferred from reading a cross section of materials produced in a specifi c time and place (Foucault 1978).
Citizenship as Arbitrary
In conclusion, I want to say a few words about characterizing the decisions that make and unmake citizens as "arbitrary, " a concept that appears throughout these chapters. What does "arbitrary" mean? Are inconsistencies among cases and between oral histories and offi cial edicts symptoms of bureaucratic randomness, or are intuitively unfair outcomes evidence of systemic biases, and thus not at all arbitrary in the sense of the fi rst meaning? Th is question might be posed of many other disparities in group treatments, including the distribution of wealth, employment, and educational resources across a range of peoples and not just citizenship papers. Th e dual meanings of (mis)recognitions return us to the question of whether the cases described in these chapters can be remediated by better bureaucracies, or whether birthright citizenship inherently entails systemic absurdities and injustice. Can we fi x the pharmakon of citizenship so that its eff ects are under the control of knowledgeable authorities wielding power appropriately? Or does the very nature of citizenship pose a systemic risk of serious haphazard, harmful outcomes not worth the potential pragmatic benefi ts? 14 Mariane Ferme, pointing out the challenges faced by deterritorialized citizens of Sierra Leone, represents these features of "arbitrariness and the law" as (1) a "well-guarded secret that exists to serve the interests of par tic u lar categories of people"; (2) "arbitrariness in the way laws are applied"; and (3) situations in which the state obscures the "threshold between legality and illegality" (2004, 83) . Th is theme is pursued as well in the astute analy sis of "capricious citizenship" put forward by Sujata Ramachandran (2015) in her study of Bengali-speaking Indian citizens. Contrariwise, Barbara Yngvesson and Susan Bibler Coutin, in their study of adoptees, emphasize the pos si ble truth of identity's signifi cations: "Paper trails, which ought to substantiate truth, sometimes plunge their referents into a real ity that is incommensurable with their sense of self " (2006, 84) . Apparently, a certifi cate can be arbitrary because it is embedded in a system of outcomes that systematically serve power ful interests, as nonsense, or because it does not give us the truth.
Not every one who fi nds citizenship's pattern of recognitions and mistaken revocations unfair sees these actions as "arbitrary." In chapter 6, Mc Ken zie argues: "Citizenship is not an arbitrary status bestowed upon individuals in government offi ces stateside or abroad. . . . It is, however, more easily defended by some individuals than others." Peter Nyers (2006) also takes this perspective, focusing on "accidental citizens" as a phrase used to impugn the status of those born in the United States to parents who are not white and were foreign-born. McKen zie fi nds these variations in citizenship determinations a logical consequence of appeals from diff erently situated supplicants, while Nyers, a critic of birthright citizenship, sees the pejoratively labeled accidental citizen a necessary outcome of sovereignty, and also a symptom of sovereignty's illegitimacy (2006, esp. 35-37).
Th ose who represent citizenship and national identity as created through the random self-divisions of what could be called the " Human Being Proj ect"-an ongoing practice whereby people are constantly (re)producing and attacking themselves represented as others, the view of this introduction-are using an analytic framework at odds with those who represent the cases in these chapters as exemplifying errors citizenship done right would not incur. Returning to a point made earlier, it might appear that this view of citizenship and foreignness as emerging from legal texts and practices and not prepo liti cal groups or attachments should be self-evident. Citizenship per se seems to emerge from law, and its signs are entirely written. Nyers argues that the concept of the "accidental citizen" makes this especially clear. Th is fi gure "breaks the bond between nativity and nationality, creates a potential catastrophe for birthright conceptions of citizenship, " and thus reveals the "bond forged between sovereign and subject at birth [is] arbitrary" (2006, 35). Nyers's critique of the concept of the accidental citizenship is apt. Yet, as Derrida helps us to understand, the logical contradictions implicit in the accidental citizen do not express their potential to undo and thus destroy belief in birthright citizenship. Citizenship's written documents are the state's references through letters, not a less real realm of mere symbols. Th e writing in the state archive has the force of state truth, a force, as Hegel points out, more robust than any biological or other prepo litical, unascriptive fact.
Refl ecting on J. L. Austin's characterization of performatives onstage or uttered in "special circumstances" as abnormal or parasitic of ordinary contexts, Derrida asks, "Is the risk [of a statement spoken in a staged or abnormal context being taken for a felicitous performative] a failure or trap into which language may fall or lose itself . . . or, on the contrary, is this risk rather its internal and positive condition of possibility? Is that outside its inside, the very force and law of its emergence?" (1988 [1972] , 17). Th ese interpretative questions help explain why the citizen who is eff ectively stateless, as well as the so-called accidental citizen, whether or not later offi cially expatriated, do not inherently unveil a true citizenship untroubled by confusions. Th e utterance "I promise . . . to pay you a million dollars" announced in a play, that is, an easily staged per formance outside the original context where it might eff ect actual results, does not, in fact, problematize or undo the exemplary force of the performative "I promise" in ordinary speech and contexts. Likewise, citizenship's legal per formances, and others J. L. Austin (1962) fi nds "felicitous, " such as marriage's "I do, " occur under conditions that also are staged, that is, in a courtroom before a judge. It is a testament to the power of writing and state rituals that at any point words and signs are so easily taken as original, au then tic, or real, as at birth (!), that generally only Brechtians and devotees of Kafk a perceive the judge's courtroom and its proceedings a form of theater.
Consider Nyers's point that the enemy combatant and U.S. citizen "Yaser Hamdi" is "actually spelled 'Himdy, ' " attributing the error in U.S. references to an "improper translation from the Arabic to En glish on his Saudi passport and then on his American birth certifi cate" (2006, 39n5) . Th is narrative suggests the authority of some putatively original document to signify a correct "Himdy." But of course the name and spelling are never other than copies, of a phonetic name either created or uttered by an ancestral relative or scribe, perhaps one from which "Himdy" was an inaccurate copy of a previous name that could have been transcribed as "Hamdi." Presumably Nyers would agree that the diff erence between a transliteration of the letter i or y from the Arab to the En glish alphabet is strictly arbitrary.
Contemplating these contexts, that is, signifi ers of signifi ers, Derrida writes, "Rather than oppose citation or iteration, " including its copies (e.g., "Hamdi" to "Himdy"), "one ought to construct a diff erentiated typology of forms of iteration" (1988 [1972] , 18). One example of this typology might be the intergenerational (re)production or iteration of a name. Derrida continues, "In such a typology, the category of intention will not dis appear, " that is, for this example, the current experience or phenomenology of the family name inscribing membership will remain impor tant, but these politics " will no longer be able to govern the entire scene" (18). Th e string of family names can be understood as iterations of a family romance and not apo liti cal truisms that compel obedience or rebellion. Via deconstruction, knowledge of the arbitrary iteration of "Himdy" as a name and as a citizen with a specifi c nationality emerges from such encounters with its ambiguities and contradictions and those of larger psychic and po liti cal structures specifi c to its possibility made explicit.
Th e tension between a critical understanding of the accidental citizen's logical fl aws, on the one hand, and a deconstructive view, on the other, is symptomatic of what might very well be the signature paradigm of legality's paradoxes, fi gured by Walter Benjamin as the "subordination of citizens to laws" (1986 [1921] , 284), insofar as these laws exist only through these citizens. Th e ambiguities and contradictions of citizenship are all seemingly "arbitrary." Consider the third defi nition of "arbitrary" in the American Heritage Dictionary: "Law relating to a decision made by a court or legislature that lacks grounding in law or fact . . ." Birthright citizenship as law depends on signs that are closer to literary tautologies materializing as facts than an ostensive repre sen ta tion, and thus any decisions on this basis are always arbitrary.
Perhaps it is this tension between the legality associated with most of the sovereign's prerogative when they are rational and evenhanded, and the sovereign's decisions on citizenship as those of caprice that mobilizes the spirit of critique scholars in this collection bring to their endeavors. When circulated through the legal system of law review articles and courts, forums where some of our authors appear regularly, their responses may prove more immediately eff ective than other scholarly critiques. Lawrance agitates over the conundrum posed when judges or lower-level government personnel produce decisions that are paradoxically legal de facto but not de jure, observing the increasing deployment of "de facto statelessness, " a vague term of art mobilized inconsistently in the international legal community (Harvey 2010, 261). Lawrance highlights the importance of scholars marshalling their expertise in history, anthropology, liter a ture, and the law for leveraging the epistemological privilege of academic inquiry to question and destabilize concepts whose force of law is not weakened by their incoherence alone. Regardless of their specifi c politics or theories, the chapters individually, and especially cumulatively, orient the audience to underexamined intuitions about citizenship and statelessness, provoking further queries about not only the magnitude of harms of birthright citizenship but also 8. Middle to late twentieth-century examples of the fi rst include most famously Michael Walzer's (1983, chap. 9) defense of using kinship rules for determining membership in the modern state; Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith's (1985) argument that the Fourteenth Amendment should not be interpreted to apply to children of parents who reside in the United States without legal authority; and John Rawls's (1999) idea that citizenship rights derive from intergenerational communities based on racial and ethnic descent. All these authors, and many others, argue at some point that the sorts of expansive rights to social welfare that T. H. Marshall (1992) locates in the development of the modern state require a range of prudential cultural and economic closures to ensure a feeling of national cohesion and preclude economic collapse.
9. For instance, Yasmin Soysal (1994) has argued that the benefi ts of the Eu ro pean Union's social welfare state are available on the basis of residence and not citizenship; Aihwa Ong (1999) has argued that people are more frequently strategizing to acquire the economic benefi ts from acquiring new citizenships; and Ayhan Kaya (1999) has shown how German po liti cal institutions have established autonomous cultural communities for enclaves of Turkish residents in Germany, despite their lacking rights of citizenship, developments embraced by Seyla Benhabib (2007) in her arguments, contra Walzer, that states should extend and protect residents regardless of their citizenship status but still maintain this distinction and its basis in current paradigms of birth.
10. Foucault's description of Ubu-esque or bumbling yet brutal, clownlike state authority in Abnormal (2003a , esp. 34-54) is much more fi tting and also largely ignored by Foucauldian critics.
11. For a study of citizenship as a legal "gray area" in U.S. courts, see Morawetz 2007a. 12. For an explanation of why nationality also is best understood through law and politics, not biology, see, e.g., Durkheim 1915; Lévi-Strauss 1969; Stevens 1999.
13. U.S. Americans bemoan low rates of voter participation but then fi ercely attack the credentials of putative foreigners.
14. For a lengthy lit er a ture review and analy sis of the utilitarian and so-called liberal arguments for citizenship based on the nation-state, see Stevens 2009b, especially the introduction and chapter 1.
